Friday, November 04, 2005

Distinguishing Roe from Griswold

Interesting thought posted as feedback from a Corner reader by Ramesh Ponnuru today on distinguishing Roe from Griswold:

"It seems to me that Roe and Griswold can be distinguished on grounds short of 'constitutional personhood,' but rather simply on the nature of the state interest involved. All the Court would have to do is recognize that a state legislature might have a reasonable belief that an unborn child is a human person in a moral sense to find that the protection of that person's life is a state interest of the highest magnitude. Certainly if racial diversity in public post-secondary education is a compelling state interest, preventing the killing of those who might possibly be people should qualify. And if we apply strict scrutiny, then it would be a narrowly tailored approach to preventing the killing of those who might possibly be considered humans to ban that killing."
Also see Robert George's comments on framing the abortion debate (also from the Corner):